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 Almost all countries in the Andean region have experienced increased civil-military 
conflict during the last decade. Venezuela has elected a former coup leader as president who has 
swiftly militarized public administration, placing over 170 active duty and retired military 
officers in senior ministerial and vice-ministerial positions (Machillanda 2001). Ecuador 
witnessed a coup d’etat in January 2000 that led to the deposal of a legitimately elected president 
and his replacement by his vice-president (Weidner 2000). Peru led the region in this area, 
experiencing a civilian-led self-coup in 1992 by President Alberto Fujimori, and a transition to 
democracy from a deeply corrupt civilian semi-authoritarian regime in 2001. A thoroughly 
complicit military played a leading role in both events (Garcia Calderón 2001). Even Colombia, 
which has made substantial progress towards democratic control of the armed forces by 
establishing a civilian Ministry of Defense, has dealt with civil-military tensions over its internal 
conflict. Over 200 officers were recently dismissed for their suspected links to right wing 
paramilitary organizations. Even Bolivia, were former dictator, Gen. Hugo Banzer, had served as 
an elected president, has witnessed some military tension over internal conflicts between the 
state and indigenous communities over coca policy (Weidner 2000). Taken together, these events 
suggest that the Andean region may be experiencing a crisis in civil-military relations. 
 This trend towards increased civil-military conflict is troubling because many of these 
countries are either among the first to make transitions during the ‘Third Wave’ of 
democratization, such as Ecuador and Peru, or are successful holdovers from previous waves, 
such as Venezuela and Colombia. Furthermore, each of these states is experiencing civil-military 
conflict simultaneously at a time of declining public confidence in democracy in the region. 
Understanding roots of political instability and democratic deconsolidation in these cases would 
provide insights into the fate of regimes that transitioned later in the ‘Third Wave.’ In particular, 
these cases provide us an opportunity to examine the relationship between the nature of civil-
military institutions and the larger question of democratic legitimacy.  
 Is the growing prominence of the armed forces in politics experienced by Andean 
countries a crisis that poses a threat to democratic stability in the region? If there is such a crisis, 
what are its sources? In this paper, I will argue that there is considerable evidence of a crisis in 
civil-military relations in the Andean region. There is also increasing evidence of a generalized 
crisis of democratic governance in the region. The intent of this paper is not to establish a 
definite causal link between the two crises in the Andean region, but rather to establish a 
research agenda designed to explore the relationship between the resurgent role of the armed 
forces in politics and democratic legitimacy. 
 In 2001, the notion of a Latin America in crisis do to conflicts over economic policy, 
globalization and social unrest seems on the verge of becoming conventional wisdom, yet it is 
important to note that crises in substantive outcomes under democratic governments do not lead 
to civil-military conflict in and of themselves. The case of Argentina today, perpetually teetering 
on the brink of a debt default, is illustrative, since the wave of labor strikes and political unrest 
this country has experienced has gone unmarred by any reference to military discontent.  
However, in the Andean region, Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela have all experienced regime 
change in the last two years, albeit not all in direction of greater democracy. While these three 
countries used to rank well above the mean Freedom House score for Latin America during the 
1980s, by 2000 they all trail the region on the basis of comparative freedom indices.1 This 
                                                        
1  Calculation by author based on Freedom House 2001 index data. See www.freedomhouse.org. 
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suggests that the deterioration of regime legitimacy in each of these cases has been particularly 
acute.  Drawing on my previous work on democratic control of the armed forces, I also find 
considerable evidence that there has been an expansion of military jurisdictions over the state in 
all three cases, well the beyond the boundaries that would indicate democratic civilian control of 
the armed forces. 
 The expansion of military jurisdictional boundaries is particularly worrisome as it 
becomes increasingly apparent that democratic regimes in the region are having great difficulty 
in finding successful development strategies for achieving stability and prosperity in a globalized 
world economy. This has undermined whatever legitimacy democratic regimes could derive 
from positive substantive outcomes, forcing them to rely on procedural legitimacy to justify their 
existence. In part, this is a result of state weakness and the consequent difficulty regime’s face in 
finding and applying solutions to problems. However, exogenous shocks from the international 
system, in the form of the Mexican and Asian financial crises, have also contributed to the 
deterioration of regime legitimacy. In the cases of Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela, the 
deterioration of substantive outcomes has been compounded by the manipulation of the 
procedural bases of democracy, such as elections and constitutions, through questionable means. 
In the final section of this paper, I explore possible links between the crisis in civil-
military relations and democratic governance in the Andes. There is evidence that, despite the 
persistence of more or less democratic forms of government in each of these states for 
considerable lengths of time, they share a history of poorly articulated and under-
institutionalized civil-military relations. The consequent blurring of policy jurisdictions between 
the armed forces and the civilian government have tempted both civilian politicians and senior 
military officers to use military forces to carry out obligations that the weak states of the region 
are otherwise unable to fulfill. There is also some evidence that the employment of the armed 
forces in these missions has politicized the officer corps, particularly in Venezuela and Ecuador. 
As a tentative conclusion, I argue that the general crisis of development in Latin America has 
undermined the both the substantive and procedural basis for the legitimacy of democracy in the 
region. The combination of the weakening democratic legitimacy and poorly institutionalized 
civil-military relations has led either to democratic breakdown, as in Peru in 1992 or in Ecuador 
in 2000, or re-equilibration, as may be the case in Venezuela today. This environment provides a 
rich opportunity for political entrepreneurs, civilian and military, to turn to increasingly 
authoritarian solutions to the regional crisis of legitimacy. 
 
IS THERE A CRISIS IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE ANDES? 
 When does civil-military conflict pose a threat to democracy? During the last decade, 
political scientists have disagreed over whether third wave democracies in Latin America has 
experienced significant break with traditions of militarism and made a significant shift towards 
civilian control of the armed forces. Hunter has argued that the electoral dynamics inherent in 
democracy tend to lead politicians to seek control over defense resources so as to divert them to 
alternative programs to satisfy their constituencies (Hunter 1997). This suggests that even 
democracies that emerged from constrained modes of transition should experience a trend 
towards civilian control of the military. Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux have noted that during the 
latest period of democratization, military participation in internal security and civic action, has 
often occurred at the discretion of civilian politicians who have retained control of mission 
initiation and termination. This is important in that military participation in these roles has 
traditionally been perceived as evidence of continuing military autonomy and a precursor to 
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civil-military conflict (Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux 2000). These scholars are representative of a 
body of work that argues that trends in civil-military relations have improved in Latin America 
during the period of democratization, despite occasional bouts of conflict in the relationship. 
 Others have argued that there is considerable continuity in military prerogatives and 
thinking between the authoritarian and democratic periods. Loveman has noted that Latin 
American armed forces continue to perceive themselves as the supreme moderators and 
guardians in their countries, despite the onset of democracy. From this perspective, the armed 
forces in Latin America retain a high latent potential for intervention in politics (Loveman 1999). 
McSherry has noted that few Latin American countries have successfully prosecuted military 
officers for violations of human rights during the authoritarian governments of the 1970s and 
1980s. Moreover, she notes a substantial continuity in the military personnel in the intelligence 
and internal security communities. From this, she concludes that Latin American armed forces 
continue to pose a substantial threat to both the quality and persistence of democracy (McSherry 
1997). From the Loveman and McSherry perspective, episodes of civil-military conflict are both 
signals of the continued military autonomy and opportunities for them to exercise their 
permanent interest in manipulating politics in their countries. 
 The key distinction between these two perspectives is the old chestnut of civil-military 
relations: ‘who governs?’ If civilian elected officials retain the institutional authority to set 
defense policy, monitor its execution, and punish the armed forces if they shirk, then civil-
military conflict is less likely to threaten democracy. However, if civilians lack the institutional 
mechanisms to exercise authority, then the internal composition of the armed forces and their 
mental map of their role in the state become critical because the survival of democratic regime 
depends on the ability of the armed forces to self-regulate.  
 In my own work, I focus on the jurisdictional boundaries between civilian and military 
authorities in the state to explore the question of ‘who governs?’ I define the jurisdictional 
boundaries of civilian and military authority within the state by examining question of who 
makes policy in each of four areas: defense, internal security, public policy (including civic 
action), and state leadership selection. I concur with Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux that expanded 
military participation in state activities is less threatening in so far as civilians retain the 
prerogative to set policy and monitor its implementation. Thus, the key to understanding whether 
civil-military conflict in the Andes constitutes a crisis is to examine the direction in which civil-
military jurisdictional boundaries are headed. Contracting military jurisdictional boundaries 
would suggest that civilians are extending their policy making authority over the state, making 
increased military participation in policy implementation largely irrelevant. A significant 
expansion of military boundaries would suggest the reverse, raising the specter of civil-military 
conflict as civilian politicians and military officers clash over policy-making prerogatives 
(Trinkunas 2000). Furthermore, the expansion of military jurisdiction inevitably undermines the 
quality of democracy by robbing elected officials of their power to make decisions about state 
policy that are compatible with their constituent’s desires. 
 In this section, I compare the jurisdictional boundaries of Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela in 
1990, a time when all of them had already experienced at least two successive elected civilian 
administrations and a peaceful transfer of power between opposition parties2, and in 2000, the 
period when growing civil-military conflict indicated a potential crisis that threatened 
                                                        
2  There is still considerable debate over what are appropriate indicators of democratic consolidation, but two 
post transitional elections and a peaceful transfer of power between opposition parties are two of the indicators 
widely cited as indicating consolidation. 
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democracy. I focus on four key areas for civil-military relations: external defense, internal 
security, public policy and state leadership selection. In the following figures, I depict the 
jurisdictional boundaries in each country, showing ‘who governs’ in each of the four arenas. 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
 In 1990, Venezuela had maintained a record of three decades of democratic rule and 
stable civil-military relations, but it stood on the cusp of a civil-military crisis that most caught 
most observers by surprise. During the 1970s and 1980s, civilian politicians maintained complete 
control over state leadership selection and public policy. Venezuela’s status as an oil exporting 
country had provided state leaders with ample revenues until the 1980s, some portion of which 
was used to build up the military. This funding had enabled Venezuela’s armed forces to achieve 
a high level of professionalism. However, in the face of financial and economic crisis of the 
1980s, newly elected president Carlos Andrés Pérez applied neoliberal policies that restricted 
state spending in 1989. Since the overall size of the defense budget was entirely controlled by 
civilians, the armed forces suffered from reduced spending and military salaries badly lagged 
inflation. The armed forces maintained a largely latent role in internal security, although one 
branch, the Guardia Nacional, acted as a militarized gendarmerie with a substantial role in border 
and rural security. The armed forces as a whole had been involved in the repression of the 
massive 1989 ‘Caracazo’ riots which resulted in several hundred civilian casualties. However, 
they had acted strictly at the behest of civilian politicians only after police forces were 
overwhelmed, and civilians controlled mission initiation and termination. This mixed picture 
provides the basis for coding Venezuelan internal security jurisdictional boundaries as ‘shared’ 
(at worst) in figure one.  
The area where the Venezuela armed forces exhibited the greatest autonomy was in their 
defense role. Institutionally, the armed forces where administered by a military-led Ministry of 
Defense. Military doctrine and education were largely in the hands of the armed forces. In fact, 
the only area where civilians actually played a role in the composition of the armed forces was in 
the personnel promotion process, where higher ranking officers needed the approval of the 
legislature and the president. Overall, this meant that the Venezuelan armed forces had 
considerable autonomy in defense policy, for which reason I have coded this jurisdiction as 
‘military dominant’ in figure one. Taken together, Venezuela had achieved a considerable degree 
of civilian authority over the armed forces by 1990, but as the 1992 coup attempts would later 
show, even the relatively limited range of autonomy the armed forces had enjoyed had provided 
a secure breeding ground for coup plots (Trinkunas 2000). 
In Peru, civil-military jurisdictional boundaries had swung widely during the 1980s as a 
result of a serious internal security crisis, but the armed forces had always retained considerable 
autonomy since the transition to democracy in 1980. The first elected leader of the democratic 
period, President Belaunde Terry (1980-5), allowed military prerogatives to remain more or less 
intact during his term of office. President Alan Garcia initially made some attempts to rein in the 
armed forces, especially on the issue of human rights, but his authority over the armed forces 
declined rapidly as the Sendero Luminoso Maoist insurgency gained ground. When combined 
with the deterioration of the economy under his heterodox adjustment policies, the result was a 
substantial crisis in legitimacy that provided an opening for a political outsider, Alberto 
Fujimori, to win the 1990 presidential election. 
The one area in which the two democratic administrations of the 1980s successfully 
excluded the armed forces was from state leadership selection. The fact that Alan Garcia, a 
leader of the APRA party, served as president despite the long standing mutual enmity between 
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the military and APRA, is evidence of this achievement. Initially, public policy was an area from 
which the armed forces were largely excluded. Both the Belaunde Terry and Alan Garcia 
administrations also initially restricted the counter-insurgency and internal security efforts of the 
armed forces, allowing greater scope for independent police action. Nevertheless, external 
defense remained a largely military controlled arena. The armed forces retained control over the 
Ministry of Defense, and other mechanisms for civilian control, such as the legislature and the 
judiciary, failed to provide adequate monitoring of military operations. Even President Garcia’s 
efforts to punish human rights abuses committed during his administration ground to a halt by 
the end of his term, giving way before the increasing institutional importance of the armed forces 
in the state as a result of the counter-insurgency war (Hunter 1997; McClintock 1998, 139-150). 
 Among the three countries discussed here, it is clear that Ecuadorean democratizers were 
most attached to a policy of accommodation towards the armed forces after the transition in 
1978. Civilian politicians did not challenge the substantial number of prerogatives within the 
political and economic system that the armed forces had accumulated during the prior 
authoritarian regime. During the 1980s, there were occasional bouts of civil-military conflict, 
including the temporary kidnapping of the civilian president by Air Force officers in the mid-
1980s. As Fitch point out, civilian elected officials had few mechanisms for overseeing the 
defense sector, and they generally allowed the armed forces to operate relatively autonomously. 
This autonomy was reinforced by the Ecuadorean armed forces legally mandated access to a 
percentage of the state’s oil revenues. Not only does this prevent the Ecuadorean government 
from using the legislatively appropriated budget to control military activities, but it also provided 
the armed forces with a considerable interest in government oil policy. The armed forces retained 
an interest in internal security, but the lack of large-scale insurgency during this period meant 
that this role remained latent within the political system. However, the weakness of the 
Ecuadorean state has also provided a rationale for a developmental mission for the armed forces. 
Military forces participate in civic action projects across the Amazon region of the country where 
they are often the only visible presence of the state (Fitch 1998: 75-105). Evidence suggests that 
the Ecuadorean armed forces retained a dominant role in defense issues during the 1980s, and 
extensive interests in internal security and public policy, as I have coded in figure one. 
(Insert figure two about here) 
 Even though jurisdictional boundaries were by no means low in the 1980s, by the year 
2000, they had expanded considerably in all three countries to such an extent that they indicated 
a potential for civil-military conflict threatening to democracy. In Venezuela, President Hugo 
Chavez, himself a former leader of a failed coup attempt, has increasingly militarized public 
administration. As of July 2001, over 176 active duty military officers serve in ministerial, vice 
ministerial and senior policy positions in government agencies unrelated to defense (Machillanda 
2001). The armed forces also engage in extensive civic-action projects under the rubric of Plan 
Bolivar 2000. Despite the appointment of a civilian as minister of defense, this has not 
represented an advance in civilian control since the new minister is not in the chain of command, 
has no civilian staff to support him, and his offices are located at a considerable distance from 
the Ministry itself on the grounds of the former Air Force general headquarters. What little 
civilian oversight of the promotion process existed prior to the Chavez administration has ceased 
under the new 2000 constitution, which removes from the legislature the power to approve 
promotions and transfers this authority back to the armed forces themselves.  Moreover, all state 
internal security, intelligence, and police agencies are led by either active duty or retired military 
officers. The result has been an increasing militarization of Venezuelan politics, and an 
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expansion of military jurisdiction over state activities, particularly in the area of public policy 
and state leadership (Trinkunas 2002). 
 Similarly, Ecuador has witnessed an expansion in military responsibilities from the 
already high levels of the 1980s. The most dramatic evidence of this is the coup against President 
Mahuad in January 2000, where a group of mid-ranking officers, allied with indigenous groups, 
successfully deposed the president. Their hold on power was brief once senior officers 
intervened to transfer power to Vice-president Naboa (Lucero 2001, 59-68). However, the 
military had already played a significant role in the removal of President Bucaram in 1998 on the 
grounds of insanity by acquiescing to his removal by the legislature and hosting the civilian 
negotiations over the transfer of power in military facilities (Bonilla 2001: 7-10). During the 
1990s, the armed forces expanded their role in civic action programs in the Amazon region of 
Ecuador, where they were often the only visible presence of the state among indigenous 
communities (Fitch 2001, 62-67). The armed forces also retained the prerogative of receiving a 
fixed percentage of Ecuador’s state oil revenues every year, providing them with considerable 
immunity from civilian oversight. Levels of military autonomy in internal security and external 
defense continued relatively unchanged as well, although the 1995 war with Peru and the peace 
process that followed generated some civil-military tension over the decision by President Ballén 
Durán to sign a peace treaty that many in the armed force disagreed with (Bonilla 2001: 8). 
Overall, the Ecuadorian armed forces played a more significant role in leadership selection in the 
late 1990s, adding to their already considerable autonomy in state activities (Fitch 1998: 152-
153.). For this reason, I have coded for an expansion of military jurisdictional boundaries in 
Ecuador in Figure 2. 
 Peru stands at the cusp of a transformation of civil-military relations in 2001 with 
election of President Toledo, but it is too soon to tell whether the new administration will be able 
to reinstitutionalize the broken civil-military relations it inherited from President Fujimori. The 
1990s witnessed both the expansion of military autonomy within the state and the expansion of 
uninstitutionalized and personalistic civilian control over the armed forces by Fujimori and his 
intelligence chief, Vladimiro Montesinos.  
The economic and internal security crisis Peru confronted when Alberto Fujimori came to 
power provided the rationale for an expanded military role in the state. Faced with a recalcitrant 
legislature and judiciary, he structured an armed forces high command to back a ‘self-coup’ to 
shut down the other branches of state power. Fujimori gave military commanders full authority 
over all government programs and function in emergency zones especially hard hit by the 
Sendero Luminoso insurgence. These zones of martial law eventually included up to 50% of the 
Peruvian population. Even after the defeat of the insurgency, the armed forces continued to hold 
power over emergency zones that held 30% of all Peruvians, and this provided the authority for 
the armed forces to intervene widely in policy (Kay 1999). Even outside these zones, the armed 
forces participated in the economy through their engineering commands, which competed with 
civilian businesses for contracts to build roads, maintain ships and repair aircraft.3 Throughout 
the 1990s, Fujimori relied extensively on the armed forces to maintain power, and this led to 
bloated military jurisdictional boundaries. 
However, Fujimori prevented this expansion of jurisdictional boundaries from 
threatening his authority by using his intelligence service to control the armed forces and society. 
Cashiered Army captain Vladimiro Montesinos slowly acquired visibility as Fujimori’s 
intelligence advisor during the 1990s and eventually became chief of the Servicio de Inteligencia 
                                                        
3  Conversation with Peruvian officers in Army Logistics Command (CoLoGe), July 2001. 
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Nacional, whose power greatly expanded during this period. Montesinos took advantage of his 
position to ensure that officers that were either loyal or subject to blackmail controlled key 
positions in the military (Rospigliosi 2000). Moreover, the new Peruvian constitution transferred 
power over promotions from the armed forces to the office of the President, and Fujimori used 
this prerogative to ensure a loyal high command (Fitch 1998: 149-150). This ensured a high 
degree of personal control over the armed forces in Peru, but one that was both 
uninstitutionalized and thus unavailable to future leaders, and damaging to the professionalism of 
the armed forces. For this reason, I have coded a substantial degree of shared authority across the 
spectrum in Peruvian civil-military relations in figure two. 
 
Implications of Expanded Military Jurisdictional Boundaries 
   In any democracy, expanded military jurisdictional boundaries can lead to increased 
civil-military conflict as the armed forces increasingly become involved in policy debates and 
policy making in non-defense areas. During this process, they increasingly substitute the 
democratic decision-making process of the regime with military criteria and procedures that are 
necessarily less democratic due to the nature of the armed forces as an institution. The expansion 
of military jurisdiction becomes particularly problematic when it is not fixed in time and place 
because longer duration missions which provide officers with considerable autonomy eventually 
create career paths for cadres of officers with vested interests in defending the expanded 
jurisdiction that provide the raison d’etre for their power.  
The fact that military jurisdictional boundaries have expanded in Peru, Ecuador and 
Venezuela is highly problematic for the success of democracy in the region. It is already quite 
apparent that in Peru, the armed forces have supported undemocratic governments during the last 
decade, although that has changed with Fujimori’s resignation and the election of Toledo in 
2001. One of the main challenges facing President Toledo is how to shrink military jurisdictional 
boundaries, particularly in areas where the armed forces have vested economic interests. It is also 
obvious that the Ecuadorean armed forces have never stopped being a powerful interest group 
that civilian politicians must account for in their political calculations. They are literally able to 
make or break governments, which calls into question whether Ecuador can even be labeled a 
democracy. The armed forces are becoming increasingly powerful political players in Venezuela, 
and they have become one of the main constituencies of the Chávez administration. These 
expanded military jurisdictional boundaries are indicate that civilian control of the armed forces 
is non-existent and even the nature of democracy in these countries can be questioned.  
All of these countries transitioned to democracy early in the third wave, or even earlier in 
the case of Venezuela. The evidence that I have presented here suggests that they have not been 
able to craft a pattern of civil-military jurisdictions that is compatible with democratic civilian 
control.4 The degree of military influence over the state in each of these cases is so expansive 
that it significantly constrains the policy-making authority of elected officials. For this reason, it 
is difficult to consider Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela democracies by other than minimalist 
definitions, although Peru appears to be reversing this trend under the new administration of 
President Toledo. The trend towards expanded military jurisdiction within the state is, in and of 
itself, is evidence of a crisis in civil-military relations in these countries. The next section of this 
paper will examine evidence for a growing crisis in democracy in the Andean region that may 
                                                        
4  See Trinkunas 2000 for discussion of civilian control and examples of military jurisdictional boundaries 
compatible with such control. 
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provide both an explanation and cause for concern regarding the (re)expansion of military 
jurisdictional boundaries in these countries.  
 
THE CRISIS IN DEMOCRACY IN THE ANDEAN REGION 
In a recent article, “Is Latin America doomed to failure?”, Hakim points out that despite 
substantial political and economic reforms, Latin America has made little progress towards 
stability and economic prosperity (1999, 103-119). Similarly, the Journal of Democracy recently 
devoted an issue to what it termed ‘High Anxiety in the Andes,’ in which a number of authors 
explore the sources of political instability in the region. A recent edited volume from the 
Woodrow Wilson Center, Crisis in Democratic Governance in the Andes (2000), reflects this 
trend as well. This shared notion of a crisis of democracy in Latin America is based on the 
observation that by many measures, democratic regimes in the region have failed to deliver and 
have thus called their legitimacy into question and imperiled their stability.  
 Regime legitimacy is a difficult variable to measure since it rests on the perceptions of 
citizens about their government. Older interpretations of legitimacy focused on either tradition 
(Burke), or charismatic or rational-legal basis for authority (Weber). More contemporary 
interpretations of legitimacy in democratic regimes focus on the process by the breadth and depth 
of citizen participation, with the underlying assumption that greater participation is associated 
with higher levels of legitimacy. Yet as Crisp points out, the key concept is that legitimacy is 
what transforms compelled obedience by citizens into willing compliance with state directives 
(Crisp 1998, 21). Without this willing compliance, the cost of exercising authority increases 
considerably.  
Theorists of democratization have focused on at least two different bases for citizens 
according legitimacy to the regime. Juan Linz has argued that legitimacy is based on the 
efficiency and efficacy of regimes, positing a relationship between these variables and successful 
governance (1978, 16-23). This is essentially a utilitarian basis for legitimacy, in so far as 
citizens support democracy because it is efficient and effective, and would presumably be 
prepared to jettison it in favor of other alternatives should it fail. From a rational choice 
perspective, Przeworski also notes that democracy can be a preferred regime based on purely 
utilitarian concerns (1991). In sum, the legitimacy of a democratic regime, or indeed of any 
regime, rests in part on its ability to deliver substantive outcomes that are desired by its citizens. 
A second basis for the legitimacy of democracy arises from the conviction that it is the 
‘least worst’ form of government, to paraphrase Winston Churchill. As O’Donnell and Schmitter 
argue, transitions to democracy often create new rules and institutions that garner the enduring 
support of political participants for the system. Karl also notes that contingent consent forms the 
basis for democratic governments, and rules and procedures developed during a transition help 
secure the consent of political elites by setting bounds on the uncertainty associated with 
democracy (Karl 1990: 1-23). From this perspective, legitimacy is based on the conviction that 
democracy is the best (or least worse) form of government. In other words, democracies are 
viewed as legitimate in so far as the procedures, rules and institutions for selecting governments 
and setting policy are followed by the participants in the political system. 
The two views are entirely compatible, forming the basis for the observation that these 
dual sources of legitimacy are what allow democracies to survive external shocks that might 
have led to the collapse of an authoritarian regimes. However, as Linz would be the first to 
observe, the erosion of procedural legitimacy based on conviction is often caused by inefficient 
and inefficacious democratic regimes.   
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In the this section, I will argue that there are serious signs that democratic legitimacy in 
Latin America has eroded on both substantive and procedural grounds. In many Latin American 
countries, democratic regimes have failed to deliver developmental goods that their citizens 
desire. Moreover, in the particular cases of Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela, institutional 
mechanisms associated with democratic government have been repeatedly violated, undermining 
the procedural basis for democracy. This has provided a fruitful environment in which civilian 
politicians and ambitious military officers can expand the jurisdictional boundaries of the armed 
forces to support their own projects. 
 
What Have You Done For Me Lately? 
 Even though Latin American states have made some progress in improving health and 
education since the 1960s, sustained development remains elusive. Growth in per capita income 
has lagged behind that of other regions of the world, and average per capita income (in 1987 PPP 
dollars) has remained almost flat since the 1970s (IADB, 2-3). The growth that has occurred 
during the 1990s has been poorly distributed, and Latin America is often cited as one of the 
regions with the greatest income inequality in the world. As a result, poverty rates in many 
countries have declined only slightly (Korzeniewicz & Smith, 8-9). Moreover, periods of 
economic growth and recession alternate quickly compared to the rest of the world, and growth  
rates vary as much as four percent on average in a given year. This undermines public 
confidence and increases dissatisfaction with government policy (IADB 2001, 6).  
 Many Latin American countries have also performed poorly in terms of maintaining the 
rule of law, providing efficient government, and fighting corruption. Democratization has 
provided for greatly increased civil and political liberties. Unfortunately, it has also been 
associated with rising crime rates, and the median number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants 
in Latin America more than twice that of any other region of the world. In many countries of the 
region, the judicial system seems to be unable to cope with the surge in crime (Hakim: 2-3). 
Similarly, Latin America fares poorly in comparison to the rest of the world in terms of rule of 
law and corruption indices (Transparency 2001). Taken together, it is clear that Latin America is 
experiencing a crisis in the public safety and the rule of law. 
 Although not consistent across all the elements compared, Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela 
have not fared well in terms of sustaining development compared to the rest of Latin America, 
let alone the world. The fact that both Ecuador and Venezuela are major oil exporters has 
subjected their economies to different dynamics than that of Peru, but all of them have been 
subject to substantial volatility in their GDP. Peru and Ecuador have had among the most volatile 
GDP growth in Latin America during the 1960-1998 period. None of these countries has 
sustained particularly high rates of GDP growth during the 1958-98 period, with Ecuador barely 
exceeding 2% annual growth, and Venezuela achieving little over half a percent (IADB 5-6).  
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Figure Three 

















(Source: World Bank ) 
 
As World Bank data suggests, growth rates have been dropping in all three countries, 
even though they had reached quite high levels in Ecuador and Peru in 1995. 
Similarly, Venezuelan and Ecuador rank poorly in terms of levels of crime, corruption, 
and rule of law (Transparency International 2001). In the wake of the Montesinos scandal, it is 
difficult to believe that the public would perceive Peru as being less corrupt than the mean in 
Latin America.   





Latin America Median Score 57 (of 91) 
(Source: Transparency International. All ranks out of 91 maximum, with lower ranks indicating less corruption.) 
 
By comparison with other Latin American countries, Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela tend 
to be worse off in terms of economic development and public safety. Only in education do Peru 
and Ecuador fare above the regional mean, although Venezuela does not share this distinction 
(IADB 2001: 13-14). 
Dissatisfaction with substantive outcomes is clearly reflected in polling data available on 
Latin America. Recent Latinobarometro polls comparing public sentiment in 1995-6 and 2001 
regarding the economic situation in Latin American countries shows a steady deterioration of 
confidence. Only Mexico and Venezuela showed improved confidence during this period, and 
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the Venezuelan case may be unusual insofar as 1995 was a year of financial crisis, while in 2001, 
the country had received substantial oil derived income during the previous two years. On the 
other hand, both public opinion in both Peru and Ecuador showed a marked decrease in 
confidence, with over 60% of respondents in both countries viewing their economic situation as 
bad or very bad in 2001. Similarly, public opinion regarding crime showed that 80% or more 
viewed the problems as getting worse in the 1998-2001 period, compared to 65% in 1995. 
Respondents also reported increases in the number of friends and families who were victims of 
crime (Economist 2001). Clearly, not only have Latin American state not been able to deliver 
improved substantive outcomes to their citizens, but these are well aware of the fact. 
 
Undermining the Procedural Basis for Democracy in the Andes 
 When faced with crisis, democracy’s saving grace is that its legitimacy rests not only on 
outcomes but on the conviction that the procedural mechanisms associated with democracy, such 
as elections, legislatures, and the rule of law, are the best means to address them. Respect for the 
procedures, rules and institutions associated with democracy is unevenly distributed across Latin 
America. However, the constitutional regime installed as a result of the transition to democracy 
in many Latin American countries has continually operated without major interruptions. Even in 
countries facing severe economic and financial crises, such as Argentina in 2001, have not 
resorted to extra-constitutional solutions to solve them. This is very real achievement for many 
countries in the third wave of democratization in Latin America. 
 This respect for democratic procedures is not found in any of the three countries 
examined here, all of which have experienced considerable deviations from the procedural norms 
for democratic governance set out in their own constitutions. In Peru, President Fujimori, with 
the support of the armed forces, shut down the legislature and the judiciary in 1992. He took the 
opportunity to call for a constitutional convention that produced a new constitution that shifted 
the balance of power within the state in favor of the president. President Fujimori also 
manipulated the legislature and the judiciary to make possible a constitutionally questionable 
third run for the presidency in 2000, and according to international election observers, 
perpetrated a substantial degree of fraud in securing his victory (Conaghan, 2001). In Ecuador, 
one populist president has been removed by the legislature on the grounds of insanity and his 
successor was overthrown by the armed forces (Bonilla, 2001). The institutions of Venezuela’s 
democratic regime were transformed or abandoned under the Chávez administration, who used 
constitutionally questionable referenda and elections to jettison the features of the ancien regime 
that he considered objectionable, included the recently elected legislature and the supreme court 
(Neuman and McCoy, 2001). In each case, politicians have shown very little regard for 
democratic procedures, and in the case of Venezuela in 1999 and Peru in 1992, they have 
received considerable public backing for their attacks on democratic institutions.   
Recent polling data from Latinobarometro, one of the few high quality longitudinal 
studies that encompasses the region, suggests that democratic legitimacy is beginning to be 





(Source: The Economist, Jul. 26 2001, www.economist.com ) 
 This poll addresses the essence of the procedural basis for democratic legitimacy, which 
is the conviction among citizens that democracy is the best form of government. The fact that 
this type of conviction has been declining among citizens in many countries is worrisome, 
particularly the most recent figures in 2001. Interestingly, Peru and Venezuela have maintained 
mid range scores on this question in spite of poor substantive outcomes in recent years, in all 
likelihood because of recent regime transitions that have been widely supported by citizens in 
these countries (Economist 2001). 
 
CONCLUSION: EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CRISIS IN 
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND THE CRISIS IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
 It is my intuition that the near simultaneity of the expansion of military jurisdiction and 
the crisis in democratic governance in Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela appears to be more that 
mere coincidence. After all, the armed forces have played a significant role in regime transition 
in all three countries, but almost always at the behest (or at least behind the figurehead) of 
civilian politicians.  The armed forces in all three countries have also been called on to provide 
remedies for democratic governance, ranging from internal security to economic development. 
The armed forces do not hold direct power in any of these cases, but it is clear that their 
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jurisdiction within the state is incompatible with democratic rule. What is not clear is whether 
factors exogenous or endogenous to the civil-military relationship are driving the expansion of 
military jurisdictional boundaries. This final section of this paper will examine two sets of 
possible explanations for the expansion of military jurisdictional boundaries during a crisis of 
democratic legitimacy. 
 
Factors Exogenous to Civil-Military Relationship 
It is increasingly apparent that part of the explanation for the expansion of military 
jurisdictional boundaries lies in factors completely exogenous to the civil-military relationship 
that pull the armed forces into a more prominent role within the state. It seems likely that the 
crisis in democratic governance is in part responsible for this ‘pull’ into politics. The weakness 
of the state in Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela and the insecurity of their regimes in the face of 
political unrest and a crisis of legitimacy has provided their political leaders with strong 
incentives to pull the armed forces into more political roles as props for their governments. 
The difficulty in governance faced by democratic regimes in Andean region results in 
part from the weakness of the non-military institutions that comprise their states. In Peru, 
Ecuador and Venezuela, state bureaucracies tend to be bloated, inefficient, and incapable of 
implementing government policies. This has meant that democratic regimes have great difficulty 
in delivering even minimal public goods to their citizens, such as the rule of law, public safety, 
or economic development. Moreover, the weakness of the state in these countries has meant that 
even when their governments do select strategies to provide these public goods, even fairly 
minimalist ones such a neoliberalism, they face great difficulty in sustaining these policies over 
time (Fukuyama and Marwah 2000).  
The weakness of the state is also compounded by its uneven distribution across the 
national territory. Not only does this mean that certain rural social groups, such as indigenous 
communities in Peru and Ecuador, rarely have access to state services, but the state has great 
difficulty in monitoring its own territory. The absence of the state in many rural areas of Peru 
and Colombia has provided a safe space for insurgencies against democratic regimes to mature. 
The recent emergence of the CONAIE indigenous association in Ecuador as a significant 
political force is an example of how social movements can become organized to make demands 
of weak and unresponsive states. In the absence of the non-military institutions of the state in the 
Amazon, social movements and the armed forces stepped in to provide services, and observers 
have noted that many of the linkages between the indigenous movement and mid-ranking 
Ecuadorean officers were formed during cooperative civic action efforts in the 1990s (Walsh 
2001: 173-179). 
Essentially, the weakness of the state has made it difficult for democratic regimes to find 
and implement solutions to the ongoing governance crisis. Under these circumstances, there is a 
great temptation to use the armed forces to provide better substantive outcomes through civic 
action. In Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, the armed forces are one of the few institutions present 
across the national territory and capable of implementing government policy with some degree 
of efficiency. In the case of Venezuela under the current administration, it quite clear that 
President Chavez is pursuing a deliberate strategy of militarizing public administration as a 
means to instill some discipline and hierarchy in the state bureaucracy. 
Citizen dissatisfaction with democratic regimes, whether expressed as riots in Venezuela 
in 1989, in the form of the Sendero Luminoso insurgency in Peru, or through social movements  
such as CONAIE in Ecuador, may also lead civilian politicians to fear for the security of the 
 15
regime. Popular dissent and unrest create incentives for elected officials to cultivate the armed 
forces as a key political constituency in support of the regime and their administration. It is quite 
clear that President Fujimori in Peru, facing a substantial economic and internal security crisis in 
1992, deliberately drew the armed forces into politics and made them a pillar of his 
administration in order to eliminate institutional and political opposition to his rule. Insofar as 
civilian politicians are able to successfully manipulate their armed forces, the temptation to use 
them to centralize power and provide regime security in the midst of crisis would seem quite 
strong. Where substantive outcomes are poor and procedural legitimacy is in question, the final 
bulwark in the defense of any regime is repression. The difference in Ecuador and Peru is that it 
is being carried out under the leadership of elected civilian officials. 
 Unlike previous crises of regime legitimacy in these countries, during the 1990s, the 
armed forces have not intervened as guardians but rather at the behest of civilian and military 
political entrepreneurs who seek to use the capabilities of the armed forces to achieve or hold 
onto power. This pattern fits events in Venezuela (1998) and Peru (1992) quite well, although in 
Ecuador there does appear to be a balance between military and indigenous political 
entrepreneurs, such as the ones that overthrew President Mahuad in January 2000, and more 
traditional military officers who retain a conception of their role as guardians and moderators and 
led the countercoup that brought Vice-President Naboa to power (Fitch 1998). In part, this 
emerging strategy of authoritarianism with a civilian face may be a response to an international 
community that is supportive of democracy and hostile of dictatorship, but unsure of how to 
assess the quality of democracy in troubled regimes. The United States political intervention in 
Ecuador during 2000 coup (Bonilla 2001), and the prominent role of the OAS in assessing the 
quality of elections in Peru during the same year (Leavitt 2001), indicate the extent to which the 
international community is willing to support democracy, but also its limits.  
 I would argue that there is not yet sufficient evidence to draw a direct linkage between 
the crisis in democratic governance in the region and the expansion of military jurisdictional 
boundaries. However, much of the data I have presented here is strongly suggestive of such a 
relationship, and it suggests that further research into issues of regime insecurity and state 
strength (or weakness) in the region may form part of the explanation for the crisis in civil-
military relations in the Andes. In other words, the source of the expansion of military 
jurisdictional boundaries lies with elected officials pulling the military into expanded roles to 
compensate for weaknesses elsewhere within the state. 
 
Factors Endogenous to the Civil-Military Relationship 
 A crisis in democratic governance does not necessarily lead to civil-military conflict, so 
long as democratic regimes have achieved civilian control of the armed forces. For example, 
even though substantive outcomes have deteriorated in Argentina, there is little sign of civil-
military conflict (Trinkunas 2000). As Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux also point out, expansive 
military roles and missions are not necessarily corrosive to democracy as long as elected officials 
retain control over the initiation and termination of military participation in non-defense issues 
(Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux, 2000). Unfortunately, it appears that elected officials in Ecuador, 
Peru and Venezuela have dismantled what little civilian control of the armed forces they had 
achieved since their transitions to democracy. For this reason, I argue that the mission expansion 
that we have witnessed as a result of the crisis in governance is potentially threatening to 
democracy. 
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 None of the countries in examined in this paper are noted for institutionalized civil-
military relations or democratic control of the armed forces, even during the hey days of their 
democracies in the 1980s. Venezuela had achieved a limited form of civilian control during the 
1958-1998 period, but it has been deliberately dismantled under the Chávez administration 
(Trinkunas 2002.) As Fitch notes, democratizers in Ecuador chose a strategy of accommodation 
vis a vis the armed forces following democratization in 1978, and figure one illustrates the 
substantial degree of military autonomy that existed in this country even during the 1980s. In 
Peru, the only civilian president to challenge military prerogatives was Alan Garcia (1985-1990), 
but even this effort collapsed under the weight of the economic and internal security crisis the 
country experienced during his administration (Fitch 1998). While Fujimori achieved some 
authority over the armed forces with the assistance of his intelligence chief, Vladimiro 
Montesinos, this control was uninstitutionalized, corrupt and incompatible with democracy or the 
rule of law (Rospigliosi). In a survey of Latin American Ministries of Defense, Fischel finds that 
Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela have among the most militarized and least democratic institutions 
for controlling their armed forces (Fischel 2000: 10). This evidence suggests that none of these 
countries has civilian institutions adequate to supervising military performance in non-defense 
missions. When civilian politicians increasingly pull the armed forces into additional roles within 
the state in the absence of institutions for monitoring military activities, the inevitable result is an 
expansion of military autonomy. 
 Another endogenous factor that has received a good deal of attention in the past lies in 
the area of military doctrines, ideologies and self-conception as to their role within the state. As 
Loveman points out, many Latin American militaries have mythologized their roles as guardians 
and protectors of the state in ways that justify their intervention against populist or radical 
civilian governments. In the cases of Peru, Ecuador and Venezuela, there is also an explicit role 
for the armed forces in national development that justifies their participation in civic action 
projects (Loveman, 269-278). In Peru, the internal security crisis caused by the Sendero 
Luminoso and Tupac Amaru insurgencies appears to have influenced the military’s decision to 
back Fujimori in his self-coup against democracy in 1992. In Venezuela, developmentalist 
doctrines of security and mythologized visions of Venezuelan history centered on Simón Bolivar 
have strongly influenced the armed forces and, by extension, former army colonel and now 
president, Hugo Chavez (Trinkunas 2002). The links between indigenous movements and the 
Ecuadorean coup plotters in January 2000 also gave rise to concerns regarding the influence of 
anti-globalization nationalist doctrines in this country’s armed forces (Weidner 2000: 4-7). 
Overall, my suspicion is that there is still not enough evidence to suggest that this factor plays a 
highly significant role in explaining the expansion of military jurisdictional boundaries, although 
additional research may be necessary to confirm this. 
 
An Agenda for Future Research on Civil-Military Relations in the Andes 
 Although the evidence presented in this paper is suggestive of a link between the crisis in 
democratic legitimacy and the expansion of civil-military relations, additional research is needed 
into several points in order to clarify the chain of causality. First, the relationship between state 
weakness, regime insecurity, and an expanded role for the military needs further explanation and 
evidence. In this respect, further analysis of the types, duration and supervision of domestic 
military missions, particularly those characterized by Pion-Berlin and Arceneaux as expansive, is 
needed. Also, the rationale for civilian (and military) political entrepreneurs for seeking out and 
relying on the armed forces as a constituency needs to be explored, particularly in light of regime 
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insecurity in the face of problems of democratic governance in the Andes. Similarly, the 
abdication of civilian politicians in all three countries of responsibility for institutionalizing 
civilian control over the military is curious given the history of authoritarian rule in the region. In 
particular, the role of Fujimori and Chávez in deliberately sabotaging institutionalized civil-
military relations seems particularly counter-intuitive and worthy of further analysis. Finally, the 
the international community’s strategy for supporting democracy in the region, and the counter 
strategy of elected civilian authoritarian rule in Peru (and possibly Venezuela) is another new 
phenomena that raises interesting questions. The crisis of democracy and the expansion of 
military jurisdictional boundaries in all three countries provide useful insights for understanding 
other cases in Latin America and globally that may be experiencing crises in democratic 
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